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Introduction 
 
 
The EU’s Revised Cybersecurity Strategy 
Half-Hearted Progress on Far-Reaching Challenges 
Annegret Bendiek, Raphael Bossong and Matthias Schulze 
In September 2017 the EU updated its 2013 Cyber Security Strategy. The new version is 
intended to improve the protection of Europe’s critical infrastructure and boost the EU’s 
digital self-assertiveness towards other regions of the world. But the reformed strategy 
leaves open a number of questions as to how its objective of an “open, safe and secure 
cyberspace” will be credibly defended, both internally and externally. The EU has neither 
properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to 
overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues. 
Moreover, controversial topics – such as the harmonisation of criminal law or the use 
of encryption – have been entirely omitted. Member states should abandon their stand-
alone efforts and speed up the legal regulation of cybersecurity at the EU level. 
 
It has been obvious for some time that 
China is increasingly sealing off its nation-
al Internet, Russia is trying to spread its 
authoritative understanding of information 
sovereignty, and the USA is engaged in a 
military-offensive form of cyber-defence. 
Experts already speak of the era of “data 
nationalism” and the end of the global In-
ternet. In view of these strategic challenges, 
the EU’s member states are seeking a path 
to digital self-assertiveness. “Cyber-attacks 
can be more dangerous to the stability of 
democracies and economies than guns and 
tanks”, Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker said in his State of the Union 
speech in mid-September 2017. At the digi-
tal summit in Tallinn in late September, 
European Heads of State and Government 
restated their determination to complete 
the digital single market to replace the cur-
rently existing patchwork of rules in all 28 
member states. In the run-up to the sum-
mit, Germany, France, Italy and Spain were 
particularly ambitious. Inter alia, they 
called for a common tax on US Internet 
giants and the creation of a secure environ-
ment that protects citizens, businesses and 
governments in exerting their rights. 
The European Commission and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy have also proposed to create a 
“solid cybersecurity structure”. Whilst the 
EU’s 2013 Cyber Security Strategy remains 
in place, the updated version introduces an 
extensive package of new measures. Some 
of these have provoked lively debate, such 
as the creation of a Union agency for cyber-
security that would build on the work of 
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the EU Agency for Network and Informa-
tion Security (ENISA). In addition, there are 
plans to introduce a European system for 
cybersecurity certification to improve the 
security of networked devices and digital 
products and services. The updated strategy 
foresees five major reforms: First, the for-
mation of a European research and com-
petency centre for cybersecurity; second, 
establishing a Europe-wide crisis-response 
mechanism to deal with future large scale 
cyber-attacks; third, the creation of a cyber-
security emergency fund; fourth, the devel-
opment of common projects in military 
cyber-defence as part of Permanent Struc-
tured Cooperation and with the help of 
the European Defence Fund; and fifth, the 
promotion of confidence-building measures 
and state responsibility, so as to contain 
cyber risks worldwide. All these proposals 
are intended to increase the EU’s resilience 
in the cyber domain. 
A more significant role for the EU in 
cybersecurity is needed for the protection 
of the digital internal market, but obviously 
it cannot become the single dominant policy 
forum in this domain, given the global in-
terdependence of technical infrastructures 
and software as well as changing national 
ambitions in cyberspace. Yet since the EU is 
the world’s largest common market, it also 
represents the largest framework for bind-
ing regulation. Seen from this angle, the 
current set of proposals for reworking the 
European cybersecurity strategy appears 
rather half-hearted. Five problems or defi-
cits need to be addressed. First, the EU’s 
understanding of resilience as a strategic 
approach remains vague. Second, European 
cybersecurity suffers from institutional frag-
mentation and a weak financial base. Third, 
the proposed measures for increased cyber-
security lack legal force. Fourth, this is par-
ticularly true for the harmonisation of crimi-
nal law in the fight against cybercrime. Fifth, 
it remains unclear how defensive cyber-
deterrence as a credible component of cyber-
diplomacy is supposed to work in detail. 
For these reasons, the EU’s updated strat-
egy is no turning-point in the ever more 
politicised debate on cybersecurity. It is time 
for the EU and its member states to over-
come limited, step-wise initiatives, and to 
address more challenging topics head-on 
so as to provide strategic orientation. Other-
wise, repeated calls for EU “strategic autono-
my” will remain empty words. 
Resilience as Guiding Principle 
Both the EU’s 2013 Cyber Security Strategy 
and the new package of proposals maintain 
a preference for civilian, police and mili-
tary-defensive instruments to protect infor-
mation-technology (IT) systems and infra-
structures. The underlying guiding prin-
ciple of resilience corresponds to the EU’s 
Global Strategy of June 2016. However, the 
meaning and impact of resilience on Euro-
pean cybersecurity needs to be defined 
more clearly. 
The term of “resilience” is not synony-
mous with comprehensive security. Instead, 
resilience refers to the capacities of any 
technical or natural system to regulate it-
self. The concept of resilience replaces the 
measurement and control of risks with the 
decentralised and flexible ability to resist 
varied disruptions and often unforeseen 
shocks. A resilient system can tolerate the 
loss of individual building blocks, and may 
even thrive through so-called “creative de-
struction”. An example is the early Inter-
net, which was founded on the principles 
of radical self-organisation and dynamic 
change. Similarly, many technical experts 
and activists advocate the development of 
open-source software, decentralised net-
works and use of encryption as the best way 
to cyber resilience. 
However, the past few years have shown 
that such a decentralised approach is in-
sufficient. The growing vulnerability of 
infrastructures to cyber-attacks or software 
errors cannot be addressed by voluntary 
cooperation and technical innovation 
alone. In liberal societies, cybersecurity is 
also increasingly viewed as a public good 
that can only be generated through binding 
regulation. Yet in order to maintain a bal-
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ance between the stability and necessary 
openness of cyberspace, the EU needs to 
formulate a more precise understanding 
of resilience. 
The European Commission rightly calls 
for an approach to resilience that encom-
passes economic, societal and political 
actors – in other words, the whole of soci-
ety. This comprehensive approach includes 
a unified market for cybersecurity, based on 
“security by design” in networked devices, 
the centrepiece of the digital single market. 
Mandatory cyber-hygiene – meaning the 
obligations to update and carefully use 
networked devices – concern each market 
participant, since the behaviour of the 
weakest link can determine the resilience 
of the whole system. At the same time, the 
shortage of IT and cybersecurity experts 
is identified as the most fundamental chal-
lenge. Calls for harmonised training and 
curricula to build up human resources are 
therefore necessary and welcome. However, 
the EU has almost no formal competences 
in education. This structural deficit cannot 
be compensated by further proposals for 
a European “blueprint” on crisis-response 
mechanisms or reinforced cybersecurity 
exercises alone. 
Overall, these measures are coherent 
with a notion of distributed resilience, but 
fail to set clear priorities, which could 
accelerate the necessary structural changes 
in member states. An overly vague concept 
of European resilience may instead conceal 
badly coordinated practices and introduce 
a lack of accountability. Blueprints, certifi-
cates and education plans do not guarantee 
resistance to actual crises or operative secu-
rity. More detailed concepts should show 
how the EU could make progress here de-
spite its limited legal competences. In the 
long term, early and comprehensive train-
ing will be the only way to close the digital 
skills gap and tackle the lack of correspond-
ing human capital. 
Institutional and Financial 
Fragmentation 
The EU should also be more decisive when 
it comes to the fragmented institutional 
and multi-level set-up for cybersecurity. The 
EU’s updated strategy makes some impor-
tant proposals in this regard. The legal basis 
and budget of ENISA should be strength-
ened in order to work on cybersecurity cer-
tification and to oversee the implementa-
tion of EU legislation on IT infrastructure 
security. Furthermore, the agency’s range 
of tasks and budget should be expanded, 
flanked by more structured and intensive 
cooperation with other relevant EU actors 
for cybersecurity, especially the Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3) within Europol. The agency 
should also take the lead on new operative 
solutions, such as serving as a one-stop shop 
for handling acute cyber-attacks. Affected 
businesses would have only one interlocu-
tor when it comes to the security of cross-
border data transfers – on whose pro-
nouncements they should then rely. How-
ever, alongside ENISA the Commission fore-
sees the creation of a further centre and 
network of excellence, which should boost 
both security research and the roll-out of 
new security technologies. This additional 
centre of excellence would be built on, and 
incorporate existing national research cen-
tres for cybersecurity. The European Defence 
Agency (EDA) should also become involved 
step by step. Finally, the new excellence 
centre should “buttress” ENISA’s certifi-
cation processes for IT products, whereas 
ENISA will retain the main responsibility 
for strategic risk analysis. 
Not all tasks can meaningfully be bun-
dled into a single EU cybersecurity agency. 
Yet the overlapping competences and inter-
faces between these different actors must 
be specified as quickly as possible. Larger 
member states might complicate the devel-
opment of an effective governance network 
at the EU level, because they are already 
heavily invested in their own national solu-
tions. The German Federal Government 
puts much effort into a new cyber-defence 
cluster in Munich while France has taken a 
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strategic policy decision to promote re-
search into artificial intelligence. To date, it 
remains wishful thinking on the part of the 
Commission that these and other national 
initiatives will be smoothly integrated into 
a comprehensive European network. Not 
even ENISA’s role vis-à-vis national cyber-
security bureaucracies – for instance, Ger-
many’s Federal Office for Information Secu-
rity (BSI) as well as its newly established 
Central Office for Information Technology 
in the Security Sphere (ZITis) – has been 
adequately clarified. 
Meanwhile, all state agencies compete 
with the private sector for IT experts, but 
they are often much less attractive than 
private employers. EU institutions should 
avoid unnecessary competition for quali-
fied staff; the scarce human resources to 
deal with acute security challenges need 
to be concentrated as much as possible. 
The desired substantial increase in training 
and human resource development in all 
member states is a very long-term ambition, 
which needs to be bridged and supported 
by an effectiveEuropean process of pooling 
and sharing of knowhow. 
For immediate impact, member states 
should at least support an ambitious financ-
ing of the new excellence network, as the 
Strategy calls on them to do. This is clearly 
necessary given the enormous sums that 
competitors such as China, India and USA 
invest in their IT industries and research. 
The new cybersecurity emergency fund 
suggested by the Commission can only be 
the beginning of a much more substantial 
reallocation of EU budgetary resources. 
However, the coming negotiations about 
the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Frame-
work risk getting bogged down in national 
net contributions and compensations for 
the loss of UK net payments. 
Weak Standard-Setting 
All stakeholders should be ready to support 
more EU legislation to strengthen cyber 
resilience. In the updated strategy, the EU 
rightly stresses the certification of IT prod-
ucts as a central step. The European (digital) 
single market as biggest global market has 
the necessary leverage, which could also 
help to increase global standardisation. 
Yet even if ENISA should work onstricter 
product certification and security testing, 
the EU does not commit to making such 
procedures compulsory. By contrast, the 
new EU directive on protecting critical IT 
infrastructure (Network and Information 
Security, NIS) has shown that previous 
voluntary approaches reached their limits. 
All too often, public-private partnerships 
for cybersecurity could not overcome struc-
tural hurdles to the timely reporting and 
early prevention of cyber-attacks. The new 
NIS Directive therefore obliges operators 
and providers of “essential services” – such 
as energy, water supply, transport, finances, 
health and the Internet – to make adequate 
investment and organisational reforms for 
cybersecurity. Member states, too, have to 
create national reporting systems. The 
widely divergent cyber capacities of mem-
ber states are the critical issue for a reliable 
implementation of the NIS Direction under 
the leadership of a strengthened ENISA. In 
the medium term, the definition of critical 
infrastructures covered by the NIS Directive 
needs to be reviewed as well, because Inter-
net providers or smaller digital businesses 
can be gateways for attacks. 
Considering this, the revised strategy’s 
cautious approach to further product secu-
rity regulation comes as a surprise. Not to 
envisage a shift from voluntary to obligato-
ry product certification is a missed oppor-
tunity for a forward-looking document. 
Traditionally centralised infrastructures 
increasingly overlap with the private use of 
technical devices in the so-called Internet 
of Things, which is creating multiple new 
vulnerabilities. Mandatory certificates and 
enforceable liability would also force pro-
ducers from other parts of the world to 
adapt to European standards, if they want 
to maintain access to the single market. 
Early regulatory action could, in turn, cre-
ate competitive advantages for European 
businesses (first mover advantage). Last but 
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not least, the growing public demand for 
IT-product security justifies transitioning 
from voluntary to compulsory standardisa-
tion processes at the earliest opportunity. 
Fighting Cybercrime 
The EU’s ambitions for legal reform outside 
the single market remain limited as well. 
To contain cybercrime effectively criminal 
offences and investigative tools for pros-
ecuting authorities need to be harmonised. 
The updated strategy mentions the EU’s 
ongoing policy debate on how to facilitate 
the cross-border transfer of electronic evi-
dence. This, and its proposal to use the tech-
nical communications protocol IPv6 as 
widely as possible, could help to simplify 
IT forensics. However, other important 
debates are dealt with in an overly cautious 
manner or simply left out. For instance, The 
proposal to draw up voluntary guidelines 
on how public-private partnerships to com-
bat cybercrime could comply with EU data-
protection laws can only be a first step. 
Evolving European data-protection laws for 
the single market (e.g. E-privacy) create 
significant tensions with the practices by 
many global companies. The US has shown, 
too, that public-private collaboration for 
law-enforcement in cyberspace requires 
binding rules, so as to avoid surveillance 
scandals or high-profile court cases that 
damage mutual trust. 
Moreover, the EU’s revised strategy does 
not take a stance on whether encryption 
technologies could be weakened to allow 
for easier access by law-enforcement and 
intelligence organisations. Encryption is 
a crucial pillar of dispersed and resilient 
cybersecurity, as it makes it more difficult 
for all malignant actors to steal data. EU 
member states soon have to decide jointly 
whether to allow “back doors” or “tele-
communications surveillance at source”, 
i.e. to break into devices to intercept com-
munications before encryption. In this 
context, member states also have to con-
sider maintaining a trustworthy regime of 
cross-border law-enforcement cooperation. 
Online as offline, criminal evidence has 
to be acquired in line with core principles 
of the rule of law and fundamental rights. 
Hence, EU interior ministers have been 
negotiating on the challenging issue of 
encryption for some considerable time 
already. The fact that the updated cyber-
security strategy fails to engage with this 
debate is a further sign of its weak political 
ambition and overemphasis on compro-
mise. 
Similarly, the strategy fails to touch on 
the thorny question of how criminal con-
tent on the Internet and social media 
should be tackled. Most EU member states 
have signed the Budapest Convention and 
thus committed themselves to prosecuting 
criminal offenses committed in cyberspace. 
Nevertheless, there is a wide discrepancy 
between European states regarding which 
actions constitute a crime in the digital 
domain. The main contention is over the 
scope of freedom of expression, or the defi-
nition of illegal “hate speech”. Whereas the 
Commission has drawn up another volun-
tary code of conduct in partnership with 
the private sector, several EU member 
states have passed stricter liability laws 
for social-media providers. Uncoordinated 
national efforts, however, have limited 
effect and may endanger freedom of speech 
both within and outside the EU. For in-
stance, authoritarian regimes such as Rus-
sia have explicitly referred to Germany’s 
new Internet Enforcement Law (Netzwerk-
durchsetzungsgesetz) of September 2017 to 
justify their own growing online censor-
ship. Coordination problems are aggravated 
by the fact that private actors are urged 
to delete content directly. This frequently 
results in excessive private decisions to 
take down content and may create a wider 
“chilling effect” on freedom of speech. Gen-
erally speaking, the reach and power of 
Facebook and Google underline the need to 
draw up binding rules at the EU level. These 
rules need to define clear, balanced, account-
able and enforceable mechanisms for pro-
tecting fundamental rights as well as ad-
dressing illegal content. 
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Cyber-Defence and 
Cyber-Foreign Policy 
The EU’s revised strategy contains little 
new on international rules and norms for 
the conduct of states in cyberspace, despite 
the intensifying global debate on digital 
sovereignty and cyber-deterrence. In cyber-
defence, the EU continues to pursue a de-
fensive approach. This is in line with its 
guiding principle of resilience, according to 
which certain risks must be accepted and 
their impact minimised. However, it would 
be helpful to spell out more clearly how 
systemic resilience combines with effective 
deterrence. Resilience first and foremost 
deters – or rather undermines the effective-
ness of – denial of service attacks and cyber 
operations that seek to disrupt critical in-
frastructures. By contrast, misinformation 
campaigns or cybercriminals may only be 
deterred by more active measures and effec-
tive prosecution. Hence, further bilateral 
agreements between the EU and third states 
on fighting cybercrime would be useful. 
When it comes to military cyber-defence, 
the EU strategy primarily refers to its exist-
ing cooperation with NATO, the option of 
Permanent Structured Cooperation under 
its Common Security and Foreign Policy 
(CSFP), and the potential of the Defence 
Fund agreed in June 2017. Because of the 
widely different levels of capacity and speed 
of digital transformation among the armed 
forces of EU member states, it makes sense 
to make cyber-cooperation within the CSFP 
more flexible. More EU exercises and capac-
ity-building in the weaker member states 
are certainly useful as well. Nevertheless, 
the question arises how these countries can 
catch up and use the new defence fund, 
while they may simultaneously be excluded 
from Permanent Structured Cooperation 
due to their lagging capacities in the cyber 
domain. 
NATO, in any case, remains the first 
point of reference for Europe’s defensive 
cybersecurity. The European Council had 
already decided in December 2013 to inten-
sify EU-NATO cooperation and adopted the 
Cyber Defence Policy Framework a year 
later. This framework is meant to improve 
the protection of CSFP missions and the 
communications security of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). EU-NATO 
cooperation on hybrid threats, which also 
includes cyber-attacks and misinformation 
campaigns, should be channelled through 
a new Hybrid Fusion Cell established in 
Helsinki in early April 2017. All NATO and 
EU member states are represented on its 
supervisory board, and common EU-NATO 
cyber-exercises now regularly take place. 
Nevertheless, the joint EU-NATO strategic 
framework remains unclear. In the Tallinn 
Manual of 2013 and 2017, NATO’s Coopera-
tive Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
made proposals for codifying the right to 
wage war (jus ad bellum) and the laws of war 
(jus in bello) in cyberspace. This should not 
be construed as a joint policy with the EU 
and its member states. 
Many academic researchers take a criti-
cal view of the digital counter-attacks con-
sidered by NATO. It is often impossible to 
identify either the perpetrators of cyber-
attacks or the targets for counter-strikes, 
a difficulty known as the attribution prob-
lem. There is a high risk of attacking sys-
tems that were uninvolved or hijacked 
themselves – and that might even be 
needed for critical supply tasks in other 
countries. Counterattacks may also trigger 
an escalating spiral of reciprocal cyber-
attacks. The problem needs to be addressed 
urgently, since some private companies 
already practice digital counter-attacks, 
known as hack backs. Under the EU’s guid-
ing principle of resilience, states should 
define their red lines and levels of escala-
tion readiness, including corresponding 
sanctions. This is predicated on the creation 
of uniform attribution standards and a 
common situational awareness of cyber-
threats. ENISA or the Hybrid Fusion Cell in 
Helsinki would be suited to this task. To 
prevent conflicts from spiralling out of 
control in cyber-space, further political 
instruments need to be specified. The EU 
agreed to develop a so-called Cyber Diplo-
macy Toolbox, which sets out possible 
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counter-measures in case of an external 
cyber-attack and raises the costs for perpe-
trators. The toolbox is expected to encom-
pass the summoning of diplomats, further 
political, economic and penal sanctions, 
as well as digital responses. However, the 
fundamental problem of attribution applies 
even to diplomatic responses. And since 
the use of the Toolbox is not only voluntary 
but also requires the unanimous support 
of all EU member states, there are multiple 
hurdles to a mount an effective defensive 
deterrence. 
Finally, the EU’s updated strategy de-
clared that cybersecurity issues would be 
prioritised in all relevant external relations. 
As a starting point, the strategy proposes a 
further “platform” to support third states 
in their cybersecurity capacities. This can 
also be seen as a concession to Eastern Euro-
pean states, aimed at improving protection 
from Russian interference in the EU’s neigh-
bourhood. Yet further global or multilateral 
processes for negotiating common norms 
on cybersecurity are only mentioned in 
passing. 
Outlook: The EU as Digital Power 
The reform proposals contained in the up-
dated EU Cyber Security Strategy of Septem-
ber 2017 are a step in the right direction. 
Taken together, they would help the Union 
to resist cyber-attacks technically, legally 
and politically. However, effective resilience 
requires a deeper engagement by member 
states. They need to adopt a more strategic 
perspective and systematically tackle any 
weak points. To date, ambitious proposals 
have tended to meet with resistance. Some 
EU member states do not see the EU as the 
appropriate organisation for IT regulation 
but prefer the OECD. Representatives from 
the information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) industry complain that EU 
institutions currently lack the requisite 
expertise. 
That is why the EU must take a step 
beyond the reticent approach that still 
characterises the new package of proposals. 
The first litmus test will be the envisaged 
European certification and identification 
framework. Led by ENISA and the European 
Commission, member states need to rapidly 
reach agreement on adequate security 
standards and move towards legally bind-
ing rules for the security of ICT products as 
quickly as possible. The private sector and 
academia must also be involved in the pro-
cess to maintain the right balance between 
innovation and regulation. A competitive 
European ICT industry depends on a level 
playing field, which would also enable it 
to do better on global markets. This shared 
understanding should help to reach agree-
ment among all stakeholders. 
The greatest challenge to building multi-
layered cyber-resilience remains the crea-
tion of reliable and trusting relationships 
between all participants. This holds true 
between strong and weaker cyber-nations as 
well as between member states, EU author-
ities and private actors. Looking beyond 
the EU, clear strategic guidelines for cyber-
foreign policy and credible links to deci-
sion-making are becoming ever more im-
portant. These include reinforcing encryp-
tion and responding to cyber-threats from 
outside Europe with political, economic 
and legal sanctions. 
Taken individually, EU member states 
and businesses cannot handle these tasks. 
If the EU truly wants to become a digital 
power, close cooperation in all mentioned 
areas, a legally binding European frame-
work and technical standardisation are in-
dispensable. 
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